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Target Environment
• Big data and big compute in one system
- Supports multiple organizations and users 
- Users access system over network such as Internet
- Users may import and run their own codes
• Data (software, input, output, and other files) has access restrictions
- Not necessarily accessible to all users
- May be sensitive
• Data is Moderate or High Sensitivity, but not classified National Defense information
- As described in Federal Information Processing Standards Publication (FIPS) 199
- Moderate Data:  Loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability will have serious adverse effect on 
organization
- High Data:  Loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability will have a severe or catastrophic adverse 
effect on organization
Example: Supercomputing Center
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Main Security Challenges
• System is accessible over the Internet
• Legitimate users must be identified and authenticated
• Users can download their own programs and any additional data that is needed
• Security should not be so onerous that it impedes the use of the system
• Actionable attempts to misuse the system should be identified and acted upon
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Security Objectives
• Identify and authenticate legitimate users prior to granting them access to the Enclave
• Ensure that users access only data to which they are authorized
• Identify attacks and block them while minimizing
- False positives – so that legitimate users are not blocked
- False negatives – so that dangerous attacks are not missed
• Ensure that backdoors are not planted in system
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Pragmatic Solution Will Involve 
• A simple architecture for protecting the big data and big processing systems
• Minimizing the exposed surface that can be attacked
• Security situational awareness to identify actionable security events
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A Pragmatic Architecture for Protecting Big 
Data and Big Processing Systems
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Secure Front End Should be Design to be an 
Attack-Resistant Security Reference Monitor
• Always invoked
• Tamper proof
• Correctly enforces the desired security policy
7
May 28, 2014National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA Advanced Supercomputing Division
Secure Front End As Security Reference 
Monitor Can be Implemented as Follows
Always Invoked Requirement 
• Network Access Control Lists ( ACLs)  ensure that SFEs are only way to access Enclave-
resident systems
Tamper Proof Requirement  
• Design of the SFE minimizes the opportunity to attack the SFE
• Implemented as a separate device or virtual machine so SFE is isolated from tampering
• Implemented with a jailed (chrooted) environment for all users which limits
- User access to system directories
- User access to only those required functions to log in and perform file transfers
• Uses Linux distribution that 
- Allows developer to start with a minimal capability system and 
- Then adds only those additional capabilities that are needed  
- Minimizes the possibility of including unneeded capabilities with potential security vulnerabilities  
Correctly Enforces the Desired Security Policy Requirement
• Authenticates users using two-factor authentication
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Secure Front End Services Limited to 
Authentication and File Transfer
• Access to the SFE should be via SSH or some other encrypted connection protocol
• SFEs should support file transfers using SCP or other appropriate protocol
- Should have sufficient storage capacity so that files could be copied into the SFE 
- Then transferred from the SFE to an Enclave-resident system
- This would be a two-stage copy
– From Home system to SFE
– From SFE to Processor & Data Front End
• SFEs are not the only approach for file transfers
- Security policy should allow users to pull data into the Enclave from a Processor & Data Front End
- Users should also be able to push data out of the Enclave from a Processor & Data Front End
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The Exposed Surface That Can Be Attacked 
Should be limited
• The SFEs should be the only system exposed to direct access from the Internet
- ACLs on network switches/routers should allow Internet access to only the SFEs
• Users on an Enclave-resident Processor & Data Front End can 
- Transfer results out to external systems or
- Pull in data or programs from external systems
• All originating inbound access from the Internet should be blocked to all Enclave-resident 
systems
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Security Situational Awareness Should 
Monitoring and Detect
Objective of Security Situational Awareness System is to protect the Enclave 
from threats such as 
– Policy violations
– Vulnerabilities 
– Intrusion attempts  
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Security Situational Awareness Identifies 
Actionable Security Intrusion Attempts
I1: Intrusion Detection System (IDS) events should be reported upon for only those that are 
relevant to
• The organization and 
• The organization’s installed systems
I2: Back doors into the Enclave should be identified since these could be used 
• By Advanced persistent threats (APTs) or others 
• To gain and maintain unauthorized access to Enclave systems
I3: APTs and Trojan horse code that is resident in Enclave systems should
• Be identified
• Have any attempt to communicate with external, hostile controllers blocked
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Security Situational Awareness Identifies 
Actionable Security Vulnerabilities
V1: Misconfigurations that could open Enclave up to a successful attack should be identified
• Systems or 
• Access Control Lists
V2: Changes in system vulnerabilities that could open Enclave up to successful attack should 
be identified
V3: New systems that have been attached to the Enclave network should be identified 
• If they are previously unknown 
• If they have not been checked for security compliance
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Security Situational Awareness Identifies 
Actionable Security Policy Violations
P1: System Administrators should be held to auditable actions
• Identified if they accessing systems directly as root
- Since root actions do not provide audit trail of who actually performed it
• Required to access systems  using SU or SUDO, 
- Since these provide audit trail of who actually performed the action
P2: The sharing of accounts should be identified, since this may indicate
• Unauthorized access or 
• Unauthorized sharing of access credentials
P3: Long duration logins should be identified, since logged-in system could provide an entry 
point into the Enclave for a malicious agent
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Questions?
